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In his new book Barnes has tackled the question of how we can moderate, if not halt, the destruction of the commons. His proposal to "propertize" the commons and incorporate them into a free market system seems sensible on the surface but reflects an unduly narrow perspective. Rather than seeking fundamental changes in our relationship to the earth and its life, he has chosen to tinker with what is.
He attributes the disappearance of the commons to corporate practices promoted by capitalism. We therefore need to expand the realm of capitalism to incorporate the commons so that market forces will lead to their protection. Moreover, this will mitigate the negative consequences of capitalist endeavor: Income from the commons sphere will be distributed equally to everyone and also will be used to fund programs that will narrow slightly the socioeconomic gap between rich and poor. In essence, capitalism practiced on a wider scale will help counter the negative consequences of capitalism-as-usual.
That Barnes does not find this a paradox might be attributed to a confusion between capitalism per se and the conditions under which it operates. Capitalism is a process for creating and aggregating wealth. How this actually occurs is influenced by such variables as technological capacities and governmental constraints. The distinction Barnes draws between shortage and surplus capitalism (Capitalisms 1.0 and 2.0) does not reflect a change in capitalism; rather, it reflects the advances in technology that increased both resource availability and product variety.
Barnes accomodates the status quo admirably. Corporate destruction of the commons? Make them pay for it. Politicians corrupted by corporate interests? Create a self-managed system that relieves them from having to make tough choices. Ineffective regulatory agencies? Create a self-managed system that obviates the need for government involvement. Need a way to manage the commons? Appoint trustees to act in the public interest. When to do this? When "corporate dominance ebbs," as it has on a few occasions.
In his effort to avoid rocking the boat, Barnes fails to entertain a commonsense approach, the precautionary principle: If a practice causes harm, end it. If we must continue, minimize the harm caused while seeking nonharmful alternatives. He also dismisses the role of government as executor of the public's will and protector of the common good.
Under such circumstances, solutions can be straightforward: Greenhouse gas emissions lead to global warming? Halt the emissions. Charge for them, mandate a progressive decrease in their quantity, and penalize severely for transgressions. Privatized access to the internet? Mandate open access. Habitat destruction caused by oil drilling and transport? Use the courts as arbiter of opposing rights and needs.
Of course, common sense and clear choices get complicated when corporate interests enter the picture. But to determine why corporations have such power to promote their interests, and then seek to remove its sources, does not fall within Barnes' purview. Neither does the notion of democracy; it seems that we are to place our faith in the trustees and managers of the commonsand in a free market that this time will yield its theoretical benefits. Why this should be the case is difficult to fathom.
The notion of a free market as savior relieves us of responsibility for the consequences of our actions. This is the opposite of what we need because if we do not understand what is happening and why, we have no reason to alter what we do.
Even then, history shows that there are no guarantees that we will act as needed. The inhabitants of Easter Island, for example, ruined their environment despite being able to see what was happening. Why was this? How do we differ? Are there human limitations that we need to confront?